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Abstract A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the
introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions ‘‘an important loss of freedom’’ as one of the
possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how
‘‘an important loss of freedom’’ should be understood. In order to get a clearer view
on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, I
will explore the link between mental disorder and free will. I examine two domains
in which a connection between mental disorder and free will is present: the phi-
losophy of free will and forensic psychiatry. As it turns out, philosophers of free will
frequently refer to mental disorders as conditions that compromise free will and
reduce moral responsibility. In addition, in forensic psychiatry, the rationale for the
assessment of criminal responsibility is often explained by referring to the fact that
mental disorders can compromise free will. Yet, in both domains, it remains unclear
in what way free will is compromised by mental disorders. Based on the philo-
sophical debate, I discuss three senses of free will and explore their relevance to
mental disorders. I conclude that in order to further clarify the relationship between
free will and mental disorder, the accounts of people who have actually experienced
the impact of a mental disorder should be included in future research.
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Introduction
A connection between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the
introduction of the fourth edition to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV). It reads, ‘‘In DSM-IV, each of the mental disorders is
conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or
pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g.,
a painful symptom)… or an important loss of freedom’’ [1, p. xxi]. In this quotation,
however, it remains unclear how ‘‘an important loss of freedom’’ should be
understood. It could indicate practical impairments (like in physical illnesses)
interfering with the freedom to live one’s life as preferred. Alternatively, ‘‘loss of
freedom’’ may relate to the freedom of the mind or the concept of free will. In any
case, the meaning of freedom within the context of the DSM-IV quotation remains
unarticulated. This article seeks to explore the possible link between mental disorder
and free will by looking at two domains in which such a link is clearly present:
forensic psychiatry and the philosophy of free will.
The article consists of five parts. In the first section, the main themes of the
current philosophical free will debate are discussed. Based on an account suggested
by Henrik Walter, a distinction will be made between three senses of free will [2]. In
the second section, it will turn out that, in fact, mental disorders often feature in the
philosophical discussions on free will in the sense that persons are considered to be
free and responsible unless they suffer from a mental disorder. In the third section,
attention will be shifted to another domain, forensic psychiatry, in particular, to
discussions on criminal responsibility. When a person performs a criminal act as a
result of a mental disorder we intuit that this person is not responsible for the act.
Why is this? In forensic literature, one type of answer to this question points to free
will. In the fourth section, I will take stock of the discussions described in the first
three sections. I will argue that, in both domains—philosophy of free will and
forensic psychiatry—mental disorders are taken to be related to free will in a well-
defined manner: they are considered to compromise free will and to reduce
responsibility. Based on the previous sections, I explore the relevance of the three
senses of free will with respect to mental disorders. In the fifth section, I will argue
that in order to further clarify the relationship between free will and mental disorder,
the accounts of people who have actually experienced the impact of a mental
disorder should be included in future research.
Free will in current philosophical debates
Based on an account suggested by Walter, we can distinguish three main aspects, or
components, of free will in the contemporary philosophical debate [2]. The first
element is that to act freely, one must be able to act otherwise; one must have
alternative possibilities open to one [3].1 If people cannot choose between
1 Walter describes these three ‘‘features,’’ or ‘‘components,’’ of the philosophical debate on free will
while acknowledging that not all philosophical theories agree on these three elements: ‘‘Those various
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alternatives because they are completely determined to act in a specific way (e.g.,
because of divine foreknowledge or because of the wiring of people’s brains), they
cannot be said to act freely. Second, acting freely can also be understood as acting
(or choosing) for a reason. Behavior that is not taking place for an intelligible reason
is not considered ‘‘freely willed.’’2 For instance, hitting another person during an
epileptic seizure, which does not occur for a reason, is not a free action, nor do we
blame the person for such an action. Third, free will requires that one is the
originator—(causal) source—of one’s actions. For instance, when an agent is being
manipulated (or hypnotized) the agent cannot be said to act freely; although the
agent performs the action, she is not the genuine source of it. The free will debate in
philosophy is largely concerned with the question of to what extent each of these
aspects is, indeed, essential to the concept of free will.3 More precisely, at the
moment, it is not clear which of these senses is pertinent to a notion of free will that
is required for moral responsibility. In addition, we should note that these
conceptions are certainly not exhaustive; there are various competing conceptions of
free will [4, 7]. Furthermore, each of these elements or senses of free will contains
ambiguities, such as ‘‘(causal) source,’’ ‘‘person,’’ ‘‘ability to act,’’ and ‘‘acting for a
reason.’’ The exact meaning that people attach to each of these might differ
significantly. Sorting out these ambiguities probably hinges on people’s metaphys-
ical and ethical commitments. For instance, being the source of an action can be
explained in a libertarian account [3, 6], but also in what can be considered a more
naturalist account [8]. This being said, within the context of this article, the
distinctions proposed by Walter provide a useful entrance to the complicated and
multifaceted philosophical debate on free will.
A special case of the philosophical free will discussion is the compatibility
problem. Philosophers have not been able to establish whether or not free will is
compatible with determinism [4]. Determinism is the thesis that there is one
physically possible future [9]. Whatever happens is inevitable or necessary because
of, for example, fate, the will of God, or the laws of nature [5]. According to some
people, the everyday ‘‘decisions’’ that we make in this world are basically in
obedience to deterministic natural laws. Philosophers have not been able to reach
consensus on whether free will can exist in such a deterministic world. The
discussion on free will and determinism has not only taken place among
Footnote 1 continued
theories differ solely in the fact,’’ Walter claims, ‘‘that they either deal only with part of the components,
or they declare one of them to be particularly significant, or they support variously strong interpretations’’
[2, p. 6]. Within the framework of this article, I consider these three elements of the philosophical debate
as three senses of free will. See also the ‘‘Three sense of free will’’ section for further discussion on these
senses.
2 Walter provides the following definition of the component of intelligible action (acting for reasons): ‘‘A
person acts (wants, decides, chooses) intelligibly, if she at least partially mentally represents alternatives
and their possible consequences, apprehends their meanings, and using this knowledge actively realizes
one of the alternatives for reasons which are—in principle—inducible to insight’’ [2, p. 31]. This implies
that the expression ‘‘acting for a reason’’ is not to be understood merely as asserting that there is an
explanation of some kind for the agent’s conduct.
3 We have to note that in philosophical debates, ‘‘free will,’’ ‘‘freedom of the will,’’ and ‘‘personal
freedom’’ are often used interchangeably (see, e.g., Kane [4, 5] and Widerker and McKenna [6]).
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philosophers; especially in the last decades, neuroscientists and psychologists have
been participating in the debate also [2–4, 10]. The compatibility debate has been
going on for centuries. And in fact, not only determinism but also indeterminism
appears to be problematic for free will, for what room would be left for free will, if
everything happened by chance? [4]. Yet, the complexity of the concept of free will
(and related issues) apparently has not undermined the value and significance
attached to it by many. In this article, I will not take a specific position on whether
free will is compatible with determinism.
But it is important to note a particular characteristic of free will: its relationship
with moral responsibility. It appears that if anything is important to moral
responsibility, it is free will [9]. Free will may be defined in many ways, but time
after time, the central question is, does this specific concept of free will enable us to
explain our moral intuitions? [11] As a result, in philosophy, discussions on moral
responsibility (ethics) and free will (metaphysics) are deeply intertwined [4, 11].
Free will and mental disorder in philosophical debates
Interestingly, mental disorders actually feature in philosophical discussions of free
will and moral responsibility. Disorders like obsessive–compulsive disorder [2],
kleptomania [12], addiction [13], and Tourette’s syndrome [14] are considered
relevant to arguments about free will. Mental disorders and references to psychiatric
signs and symptoms even feature in crucial papers that have shaped the debates on
moral responsibility and free will over the last decades. Examples are Strawson’s
Freedom and Resentment [15] and Frankfurt’s ‘‘Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person’’ [16]. In the latter paper, in order to explain a hierarchical
account of freedom, Frankfurt describes an addict as a person who is not free. More
precisely, on Frankfurt’s account, acting of one’s own free will implies that one
wills the action and also wants to have the will to perform the action. An addict who
has the will (or first order desire) to use heroin but who does not want to have this
will is not free when using heroin. And in Watson’s interpretation of Frankfurt’s
theory of responsibility, freedom should be perceived as a certain capacity people
usually have, which ‘‘can be destroyed by addictions or phobias’’ [10, p. 17].
Another example of the way in which mental disorders or psychopathological
symptoms are used in the debate can be found in Galen Strawson:
Compatibilists believe that one can be a free and morally responsible agent
even if determinism is true. Roughly, they claim, with many variations of
detail, that one may correctly be said to be truly responsible for what one does,
when one acts, just so long as one is not caused to act by any of a certain set of
constraints (kleptomaniac impulses, obsessional neuroses, desires that are
experienced as alien, post-hypnotic commands, threats, instances of force
majeure, and so on). [17, p. 222]
Apparently, kleptomanic impulses and obsessional neuroses can undermine free
will and responsibility in this compatibilist account. Peter Strawson previously
made an almost identical claim with respect to a certain compatibilist position:
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What ‘‘freedom’’ means here is nothing but the absence of certain conditions
the presence of which would make moral condemnation or punishment
inappropriate. They [certain compatibilists] have in mind conditions like
compulsion by another, or innate incapacity, or insanity, or other less extreme
forms of psychological disorder. [15, p. 73]
According to this view, both ‘‘insanity’’ and ‘‘less extreme forms of psychological
disorder’’ undermine freedom to such an extent that moral condemnation is no
longer appropriate. In the same vein, Widerker and McKenna state that ‘‘not all
persons are morally responsible agents (such as small children, the severely
mentally retarded, or those who suffer from extreme psychological disorder)…’’ [6].
According to Kalis et al., in the philosophy of free will, ‘‘[a]ddiction and
compulsion are… presented as two different manifestations of the same thing—
namely, unfree actions or actions caused by irresistible desires’’ [18, p. 409]. And
Watson states that ‘‘[a]ddiction… is commonly invoked as a kind of paradigm of
unfree will’’ [10, p. 20]. Meanwhile, with respect to alcoholism or ‘‘heavy
drinking,’’ there are also other views. Herbert Fingarette, a philosopher with an
interest both in free will/responsibility and mental disorders, for instance, is critical
about the idea that heavy drinking or alcoholism (completely) undermines free will
[19]. He starts out by writing that ‘‘[a]nyone who has ever observed the behavior of
a chronic heavy drinker cannot help feeling a sense of momentum at work. In some
way the inclination to down another drink seems to escape the full reach of rational
judgment and of cool and deliberate free choice’’ [19, p. 32; emphasis added]. Yet,
combining several strands of observations and research, Fingarette aims to prove
that this view is, at least in part, falsified by empirical data by emphasizing that there
is still (some form of) self-control present in alcoholism (e.g., people appear to be
able to moderate their drinking in certain periods). This would imply that there is
still a voluntary aspect preserved in heavy drinking, and that it does not involve an
all-out loss of control and the ability to choose freely.4
Daniel Levy, in a paper on free will and developments in cognitive neuroscience,
zooms in on obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD): ‘‘We understand that a person
suffering from obsessive–compulsive disorder, spending all day washing his hands
and checking dozens of times that he remembered to lock the front door, cannot be
thought of as having free will. His actions are mechanically dictated by stereotyped
scripts, from which he cannot escape. Thus, obsessive–compulsive disorder is a
malady of free will, because it prevents normal strategic planning and meta-control
of behavior from overcoming compulsions’’ [20, p. 214; emphasis added]. And
Patricia Churchland apparently has a comparable opinion for she writes in a section
on free choice and caused choice, ‘‘A patient with obsessive–compulsive disorder
(OCD) may have an overwhelming urge to wash his hands…. OCD patients often
indicate that they wish to be rid of hand-washing or footstep counting behavior, but
cannot stop. Pharmacological interventions, such as Prozac, may enable the subject
to have what we would all regard as normal, free choice about whether or not to
wash his hands’’ [21, p. 208; emphasis added]. Finally, within the context of an
4 Meanwhile, it is important to note that Fingarette doesn’t consider alcoholism to be a psychopath-
ological condition [19].
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argument on the requirement of alternative possibilities (one of the elements of free
will mentioned earlier), Daniel Dennett even refers to fear of flying as an excusing
condition [22, p. 556]. This implies that more common mental traits like phobias
have a bearing on responsibility.
As it appears, according to philosophers, mental disorder implies that free will
and responsibility are compromised. Addiction and compulsion are kinds of
disorders philosophers particularly refer to, but, in fact, all mental disorders, ranging
from insanity to less extreme forms of psychological disorder, have some
detrimental effect on free will and responsibility.5 Meanwhile, what it is exactly
that mental disorders do that leads to a suspension of freedom and responsibility
remains unclear. Philosophers of free will seem to be primarily interested in
describing responsibility and freedom in subjects whose free will and responsibility
are not affected. Less attention has been paid to identifying the precise reasons why
(certain) mental disorders would diminish free will; a detailed analysis of what it is
that mental disorders do that has such an effect on free will is lacking. And while
several of the quotations refer to mental disorders within the context of a
compatibilist argument or view (which would mean that what mental disorders do to
free will is explicable also in a deterministic world), it does not become clear how
exactly the effect of mental disorder on free will should be understood in a
deterministic world (Strawson and perhaps Wolf may be considered to provide the
beginning of such an account [12, 15]).
The topic of the next section is free will in forensic psychiatry, in particular, in
theoretical reflections on the conceptual underpinnings of forensic assessment of
criminal responsibility. It turns out that there are significant similarities between
philosophical debates and forensic psychiatric views on free will and mental
disorder.
Free will in forensic psychiatry
In legal procedures, forensic psychiatrists may be asked to assess the defendant with
regard to criminal responsibility. For the court is not only interested in whether or
not the defendant was the person who performed the legally relevant act but also in
whether the defendant can be held accountable for that act. The issue at stake in
such assessments is often referred to as ‘‘criminal responsibility.’’ Several legal
criteria or rules have been established in order to assess criminal responsibility. The
most influential is the M’Naghten Rule, which can be formulated as follows: ‘‘At
the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from the disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was
wrong’’ [23, p. 11]. Although the issue at stake is considered to be criminal
responsibility, an area of dispute concerns the question, should forensic psychiatrists
indeed express their view on whether the defendant is actually responsible (or not
5 Although, based on Fingarette’s account, one could challenge this view with respect to alcohol
addiction.
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responsible) for the crime? Some hold that psychiatrists should not state whether or
not a defendant is actually responsible or not; this judgment should be left to the
jury or judge [24].
The legal rules, like the M’Naghten Rule, however, do not immediately answer
the question, what basic moral notion makes us intuit that ‘‘diseases of the mind’’
have anything to do with accountability or responsibility? For instance, we intuit
that the mother who kills her baby because of a delusional state in a postpartum
psychosis is not morally and legally responsible for the act. She should be treated,
not punished. Why? One important consideration explicitly refers to free will. A
clear example is provided by Reich in Psychiatric Ethics. He states that ‘‘the law
recognizes that insanity compromises free will, and classifies someone without free
will as legally not responsible for his or her actions…’’ [25, p. 206]. This
understanding of the rationale for forensic assessments implies, at least according to
Luthe and Ro¨sler, that forensic psychiatrists ‘‘will have to concern themselves with
the question of whether human actions can be freely chosen or whether the acting
person could not avoid acting as he did.’’ [26]. Because of the perceived role of free
will in forensic assessment, some theorists even consider the compatibility question
to be relevant to forensic psychiatry [27]. Morse suggests that the idea among
forensic practitioners that free will is a specific or foundational criterion for
responsibility in morality and law is widespread [28].6 Such a view can lead forensic
practitioners to refer to free will in their testimony before the court. They might say,
for instance, that the defendant ‘‘lacked free will’’ and that, therefore, he or she is
not accountable for the act.
In forensic practice, it is relevant that not all mental disorders are usually
considered to be ‘‘candidates’’ for an insanity defense. Psychotic disorders,
especially, are considered to have potentially decisive influence on human action
[23, 29]. However, there are no clear arguments that state that other mental
disorders (other than psychosis) could not, in principle, provide grounds for an
insanity defense [23].
In sum, the way in which free will is relevant to the forensic debate is in line with
the way mental disorders are relevant to the philosophical debates on free will (see
previous section). For the overall idea derived from the philosophy of free will is
that—if anything—free will is required for moral responsibility and that free will
can be compromised by mental disorder. This appears to be the line of thought
present in the literature on forensic psychiatry as well. Yet, there also seems to be a
difference between both domains. In forensic psychiatry the idea is clearly
expressed that while mental disorders can, in certain cases, compromise free will,
they do not necessarily undermine responsibility. Forensic assessment, therefore, is
necessary not only in order to assess the presence of a mental disorder but also to
assess the actual influence of the mental disorder on the agent’s acts. The mere
presence of a mental disorder is certainly not sufficient for concluding that the
6 It should be noted that not everyone is convinced that free will is essential to forensic assessment (see,
e.g., [28]). Meanwhile, given the focus of this article, I will concentrate on the perspective on forensic
assessment in which free will is relevant.
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defendant cannot be held accountable for the act. This view is less explicitly present
in the philosophical debate.
Three senses of free will
As pointed out, given the current philosophical discussions, we can distinguish at
least three senses of free will. Consequently, the sentence ‘‘mental disorders are able
to compromise free will’’ can have different meanings. It could mean that mental
disorders are able to undermine the agent’s ability to act otherwise, or that they can
compromise his acting for intelligible reasons, or finally, it could mean that mental
disorders may deprive a person from being the (causal) originator of the action. In
what follows, mental disorder will be tentatively linked to each of these three
different senses of free will.
Acting for (intelligible) reasons. Tics in Tourette’s syndrome (a neuropsychiatric
disorder) are often considered to be performed without any reasons at all [30]. In
such cases, people may flex their arms or utter sounds or words without any
particular reason or motive. From the perspective of an ‘‘acting for reasons’’ view of
free will, such a movement (which, in theory, can result in a criminal offense) is not
performed freely. Also, in catatonia there may be movements for which there are no
apparent reasons. For instance, there may be a stereotypical, repetitive behavior that
does not seem to be explicable in terms of reasons [31].7 Yet, most mental disorders
will not result in behavior for which no reason at all can be given. In fact, a
characteristic of mental disorders is that, unlike many ‘‘somatic’’ disorders, they
affect the intentional aspect of behavior. For example, a person who acts because of
a paranoid delusion, acts for reasons influenced by a delusion: he killed his mother
because he was convinced that she was continuously intoxicating him, and
therefore, he wanted to stop her. So, on this account, except for, e.g., tics in
Tourette’s and catatonic states, the criterion of ‘‘acting for reasons’’ per se will not
lead to considering psychiatric disorders in general as potentially undermining free
will.8 (See also the next section on Tourette’s syndrome: not all tics are experienced
as completely involuntary.)
The genuine source of the action (origination). Some might prefer to phrase
this as ‘‘the person is the causal initiator of the action’’ (this conception is
related to the philosophical position of source incompatibilism [6]). According to
this view of free will, only actions whose source lies in the agent himself can be
considered to be free actions. Now, actions performed because of delusions
7 We have to note that both Tourette’s syndrome and catatonia may also be relevant to both of the other
senses of free will (being the genuine source of the action and having alternative possibilities).
8 In my account of ‘‘acting for understandable reasons,’’ I emphasize the fact that actions are performed
for reasons as such. Walter mentions ‘‘acting for understandable reasons’’ in order to grasp the notion of
intelligibility [2, p. 31]. If one would emphasize, however, the understandability of the reasons with
respect to actions stemming from mental disorder (for instance in case of delusional behavior), this might
well lead to a different conclusion in the sense that the reasons behind actions stemming from mental
disorders may not always be (easily or fully) understandable.
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might not be considered to stem from the person himself. In fact, in forensic
psychiatry it is sometimes said that the mental disorder caused the crime [32].
This idea of ‘‘mental disorder as the cause of an offense’’ provides room for the
view that it was not the person himself who did it but that it was, instead, a
mental disorder that caused the crime. The attribution of blame and responsi-
bility, therefore, should not be directed at the person proper—for he or she is not
the genuine source of the action. In one of the quotes from the philosophical
debate (by Galen Strawson, see above) this can indeed be found: ‘‘just so long
as one is not caused to act by… kleptomaniac impulses, obsessional neuroses’’
[17, p. 222; emphasis added]. On this view, the person apparently is not the
genuine source of the act in the sense that it was the mental disorder that caused
the offense. For instance, consider an otherwise highly responsible person who is
suffering from a bipolar disorder and who is convinced that he is entitled to
harm innocent individuals, and via associative thinking, he comes up with a plan
which results in a crime. Interpreting what occurred, we might say that during
this manic episode, he was not ‘‘himself’’ and hence not responsible; he
performed the act, but he was not performing it ‘‘freely’’ but as a result of a
bipolar disorder. On such an account, the sense of free will as being the genuine
source of the action might lead to considering acts resulting from (certain)
mental disorders as ‘‘not free.’’
Alternative possibilities. Are alternative possibilities for action or choice required
for free will? [6]. This has been one of the thorniest issues in the philosophical free
will debate, especially during the last decades. Meanwhile, in the forensic literature,
alternative possibilities are mentioned as being compromised by mental disorder.
For instance, Van Marle, a Dutch forensic psychiatrist, explaining forensic
assessments in the Netherlands, states:
Undiminished responsibility means that the person concerned had complete
access to his or her free will at the time of the crime with which he or she is
charged and could therefore have chosen not to do it. Irresponsibility means
that the person concerned had no free will at all with which to choose at the
time of the crime with which he or she is charged. Important here is
determining the moment when aspects of the disorder become manifest in
the situation (‘‘the scene of the crime’’) that will eventually lead to the
perpetration. The earlier they play a role, the more inevitable will be the
(disastrous) sequence of events, and the stronger will be the eventual
limitation of free will. [33; emphasis added]
The phrase ‘‘could therefore have chosen not to do it’’ implies, at least within this
context, that mental disorders can undermine the possibility to choose between
alternatives, and that this is why the person did not act freely. This also appears to
be the case in the earlier quotes about OCD by Levy (‘‘he cannot escape’’) and
Churchland (‘‘OCD patients… cannot stop’’)—both point to a lack of alternative
possibilities. So, apparently, free will could be negated by mental disorder in that
mental disorders may undermine the person’s ability to choose between alternatives.
If this is taken to be the meaning of free will within the forensic context, we should
note that this perspective also appears to be most directly vulnerable to attacks from
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(hard) deterministic views on free will, which claim that in our world, there are
never any real alternatives. In addition, as mentioned above, compatibilist accounts
of free will that do not rely on the element of alternative possibilities also express
the idea that mental disorders undermine free will (see quotations from Galen and
Peter Strawson above). This would imply that, at least in their (compatibilist) view,
the alleged detrimental effect that mental disorders have on moral responsibility is
not because they eliminate alternative possibilities.
In conclusion, there are different senses of free will, and, in principle, each of
them could be relevant to the question of why mental disorders threaten
responsibility. Each of the senses might also result in different answers to the
question of whether free will is indeed undermined by certain mental disorders.
Based on our preliminary considerations, one could understand the sentence
‘‘mental disorders are able to compromise free will’’ in terms of mental disorders
undermining the person being the actual source of the action. This could make sense
both from a forensic and philosophical perspective. Mental disorder, then, would
affect the element of origination.
Apart from these senses of free will, there is the issue of degrees of freedom. It
might be that various mental disorders result in different degrees of ‘‘compromised’’
free will. For instance, psychotic disorders appear to be the paradigm cases of
compromised free will in forensic psychiatry [23, 29], which suggests that their
effects on free will are more pronounced than those of, e.g., obsessive–compulsive
disorder (OCD). But is it indeed justified to look at these disorders in this way? Is
the severity of the disorder proportionally related to the (alleged) influence on free
action and free choice? Are mental disorders capable of undermining free will and
responsibility irrespective of their severity? The philosophy of free will seems to
suggest the latter, because ‘‘less extreme forms of psychological disorder’’ are also
considered to be relevant to free will.
Theory and real people
So far, the exploration of the link between mental disorder and free will in this paper
has been a theoretical endeavor. However, elucidating the relationship between
mental disorder and free will and/or responsibility should not be a merely
conceptual topic. It would be particularly interesting to qualitatively and quanti-
tatively study the extent to which people who actually suffer(ed) from mental
disorders experience(d) an effect on their free will and/or responsibility. Their
accounts are remarkably absent from the philosophical and forensic discussions on
free will and mental disorder; in general, philosophers, as well as forensic theorists,
appear just to assume the (partial) absence of freedom in these conditions. However,
outside the theoretical literature, we occasionally find brief accounts of people with
mental disorders linking their condition to free will, like in the case of John in Best
Possible Odds: Contemporary Treatment Strategies for Gambling Disorders: ‘‘John,
a 38-year-old salesman, was being treated on an outpatient basis for a $1,000-a-
week video poker gambling habit. As part of his sales job, he commuted by or near a
number of video poker establishments. ‘Often,’ he noted, ‘I find them almost
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irresistible. It’s like I lose my free will when I am around them’’’ [34, p. 138;
emphasis added].
There are several reasons for the importance of a ‘‘first person’’ perspective on
this matter. The first reason is that it is about psychopathological mental states. Such
mental states are not easily accessible to everybody. Therefore, those who have had
experiential access to these states or conditions should not be excluded from, but
welcomed into, discussions on the relation between mental disorder, free will (in
whatever sense), and responsibility. Notably, there are a huge variety of mental
disorders, so being familiar with one of them is certainly not enough.
Second, an interesting study by Lang on movement disorders showed some
surprising results with respect to ‘‘voluntariness’’ and certain psychopathological
features [35]. It was long taken for granted that the tics in the neuropsychiatric
Tourette’s syndrome were produced involuntarily. However, Lang aimed to
determine the subjective perception patients have of abnormal movements by
interviewing these patients on the ‘‘voluntary’’ versus ‘‘involuntary’’ aspects of
their symptoms [35]. The majority of tic-disorder patients reported that their tics
were voluntary; their motor and phonic tics were intentionally produced (this, of
course, does not imply that these people want to have tics or Tourette’s
syndrome, but it is, rather, about the specific nature or phenomenology of some
of the tics and how their execution comes about [30]). Apart from the
significance of this observation as such, there was an interesting practical
implication of this finding. Because of the apparent intentional nature of some of
the tics, it was hypothesized that cognitive behavioral therapy, especially the
element of exposure and response prevention, might be beneficial. And, indeed,
this kind of therapy has been used with at least some success to treat Tourette’s
syndrome [30]. This indicates, first, that one can be surprised by the experience
of ‘‘(in)voluntariness’’ reported by persons with a (neuro)psychiatric disorder and,
second, that these reports can eventually result in the development of successful
therapeutic interventions as well. So, we might be surprised by what people with
OCD, addiction, and impulse-control disorders have to say about the ‘‘freedom’’
of their actions.
The third, though related reason concerns the fact that the discussion, as we have
seen, apparently takes for granted that mental disorder is linked to reduced freedom.
Now it might be that this basic view is not in line with actual experience, at least in
some conditions. In fact, it might be that the kind of mental disturbance that
intuitively appears to compromise ‘‘freedom’’ the most (e.g., manic or psychotic
disorder) is not experienced as such by the person himself or herself during a
psychotic episode. It would be interesting to ask people, not only during but also
after the psychotic (delusional) episode, how they feel about their ‘‘free will’’ during
the psychotic episode.
More precisely, examining ‘‘first person’’ reports may shed light on questions like
the following: Are there perhaps specific symptoms that lead to the experience of a
reduction in or loss of ‘‘free will’’? Should free will as it relates to mental disorders
be considered primarily as a matter of degree? In principle, research aimed at
systematically collecting and analyzing such first person accounts should cover the
entire range of mental disorders, from phobias to psychotic disorders.
Free will and mental disorder 439
123
Given the fact that there is a significant lack of clarity about the nature of forensic
assessment, getting a clearer view on the elements of the concept of free will that
are potentially relevant to forensic assessments could help to clarify this psychiatric
practice. This is especially important since this practice may have a profound impact
on legal procedures and, therefore, on people’s lives. Still, we should consider the
possibility that it is easier to (intuitively) know when free will is or is not present
than it is to give an account of free will itself, and that, in a way, the former might be
accomplished more effectively if we do not insist on linking it to the latter. Yet, as it
is, forensic theorists and practitioners are actually already troubled by the topic of
free will as it relates to the insanity defense [28, 36]. More precisely, (at least some)
forensic theorists and practitioners are concerned about the role of free will in
forensic assessment in view of allegedly deterministic (e.g., neuroscientific) theories
[28]. Given their concern, it might, for instance, be important to know whether
mental disorder affects free will in a meaningful way in a deterministic world.
Although I have pointed to the relevance of empirical research on the experience
of freedom in several mental disorders, conceptual issues also deserve further
attention. As mentioned earlier, the framework of the three elements leaves ample
room for questions and alternative interpretations. For instance, with respect to the
person being the ‘‘genuine source of the action,’’ I mentioned that the mental
disorder—rather than the ‘‘person proper’’—could be considered the cause of a
crime. Yet, this raises the question, what is the person proper and how can one
distinguish the person proper from a mental disorder? This line of questioning will,
sooner or later, bring up the question, what exactly is a mental disorder?—a central
topic in the philosophy of psychiatry [37]. And if we focus on the ‘‘cause’’ of an
event, then we must decide how to assess, among the manifold phenomena that
contribute to the occurrence of a particular event (e.g., actions), which of these
contributory phenomena count as an authentic ‘‘cause.’’ For instance, did an addict’s
original decision to use heroin cause the heroin addiction and thus also cause the
actions that subsequently resulted from the heroin addiction? In brief, a central issue
will be, how do the person proper and the disorder relate and how can they be
distinguished when it comes to the initiation of actions?
Within the medical domain, exploring the link between mental disorder and free
will might not only be relevant with respect to forensic practice but also to questions
about informed consent. Roberts clearly points to the role of ‘‘freedom’’ as a
component of voluntarism in issues of informed consent: ‘‘Voluntarism involves the
capacity to make this choice freely and in the absence of coercion’’ [38, p. 707]. She
also states, ‘‘Our understanding of voluntarism in this country is more intuitive and
involves philosophical ideals of freedom, independence, personhood, and separate-
ness’’ [38, p. 705]. Moreover, she identifies mental illnesses and other psychological
conditions as factors that may hamper voluntarism thus understood. Elucidating the
relationship between mental disorder and matters of free will might therefore not
only be beneficial to forensic discussions and to the philosophy of free will but,
moreover, to other responsibility-related topics in which mental disorders play a
role, like discussions on what it takes to obtain valid informed consent [39].
Finally, as mentioned before, while to some it might appear self-evident
that mental disorders may compromise free will, we should not take that for granted.
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It is important, at least, to clarify whether mental disorder would invariably lead to
some effect on free will or whether it is possible that a specific mental disorder does
not affect free will at all. Notably, not considering people suffering from a mental
disorder to be responsible agents (with respect to certain acts or decisions) might
lead to a form of exclusion—which is always a risk with mental disorders [40]. On
the other hand, holding persons responsible for behaviors that were, in fact, the
result of a mental disorder, like postpartum psychosis, might also lead to forms of
exclusion. Indeed, acknowledging that a certain behavior was the result of a
temporary mental disorder and not due to the person’s own choice, so to speak,
might even prevent that person from being excluded from the community.
Conclusion
In this paper the link between mental disorder and free will was explored as it is
present in two domains: philosophy of free will and forensic psychiatry. As it turns
out, philosophers working on free will often view mental disorders as compromising
free will and, hence, as threatening or reducing responsibility. In forensic
psychiatry, mental disorders are also viewed as compromising the agent’s free
will and legal responsibility. Meanwhile, in philosophy, free will turns out to be
hard to define. However, three central elements or senses of free will are present in
the philosophical debate. Consequently, the sentence ‘‘mental disorders are able to
compromise free will’’ can have at least three different meanings. In order to
explore the link between mental disorder and free will, we tentatively related each
of these three senses to mental disorder. Based on our preliminary considerations,
understanding the sentence in terms of the mental disorder preventing the person
from being the actual source of the action could make sense both from a forensic
and a philosophical perspective. Mental disorder, then, would affect the element of
origination.
Returning to the ‘‘important loss of freedom’’ phrase in the introduction of the
DSM-IV, which motivated this article, I conclude that freedom in the sense of free
will could indeed be a meaningful understanding of this phrase. Both the
philosophical debate on free will and forensic psychiatry suggest that mental
disorders may affect free will. Yet, the sense of free will that may be affected by
mental disorder in general and by specific disorders in particular remains to be
elucidated. It is, therefore, important to further study this link, especially because of
the value attached to free action and free decision-making in the lives of individual
people and because of the impact of (not) ascribing praise and blame to an agent. It
is noteworthy that the mental states associated with mental disorders are not
immediately accessible to everybody. Therefore, further research should not only be
conceptual in nature but also involve first person and firsthand accounts of people
who actually suffered or suffer from mental disorder. Their experiences should
inform the discussion on free will and mental disorder.
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